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Asbestos Legislation II: Section
524(g) Without Bankruptcy
Francis E. McGovern'
Legislation is in season for asbestos litigation. Judges,' lawyers,2 and
legislators3 all share a belief that asbestos litigation is a national tragedy-a
tragedy for victims and defendants alike-which deserves a national
statutory solution. The dilemma is: which solution? There are at least five
models for legislative reform being considered: (1) a criteria bill, 4 (2) a
defined contribution system,5 (3) a defined distribution system, 6 (4) a hybrid
involving all three of the above,7 and (5) the subject of this discussion, a
statute proposing a bankruptcy-type end game without the necessity of filing
for bankruptcy.'
* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. The background for this article is found in the
author's experience as a court-appointed neutral in the Manville, UNR, Amatex, National Gypsum,
Celotex, Federal-Mogol, Owens Coming, and Kaiser bankruptcies and as a mediator in several other
asbestos cases. Great appreciation is due to the judges, attorneys, and experts who have contributed
so much to an understanding of the complexities of this subject. Invaluable assistance has been
provided specifically for this article by Joyce Cox, Maribeth Minella, Mark Hurford, Melanie
Dunshee, Cathy Quezada, and Andrea Kloehn Naef. Many thanks for turning a speech into an
article.
I. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD
Hoc COMMITrEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION (1991).
2. See, e.g., ABA COMMISSION ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION, RECOMMENDATION TO THE HOUSE
OF DELEGATES (2003). available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/full-report.pdf.
3. See Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2003, S. 1125, 108th Cong. (2003).
4. See A Bill To Provide For the Fair And Efficient Judicial Consideration of Personal Injury
And Wrongful Death Claims Arising Out of Asbestos Exposure, To Ensure That Individuals Who
Suffer Harm, Now Or In The Future, From Illnesses Caused By Exposure To Asbestos Receive
Compensation For Their Injuries, And For Other Purposes, S. 413, 108th Cong. (2003).
5. Francis E. McGovern, Asbestos Legislation I: A Defined Contribution Plan, TENN. L. REV.
(forthcoming).
6. See, e.g., The September 11 th Fund, How We Work, at http://www.september I I fund.org (last
visited Nov. 20, 2003) (explaining how funds are distributed).
7. Fairness In Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2003, S. 1125, 108th Cong. (2003).
8. See Francis E. McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. REV. 1721,
The purpose of this article is not to support any single alternative, but to
provide sufficient background and detail concerning the fifth option so that it
can become part of the national conversation on asbestos litigation. This
article first reviews the basic issues and historic outcomes in traditional
asbestos bankruptcies. Next, it analyzes the intricacies of prepackaged
bankruptcies involving asbestos companies. Finally, it outlines a statute that
would allow asbestos companies the same protections from asbestos
litigation found in bankruptcy without the necessity of these companies
actually filing for bankruptcy.
I. TRADITIONAL ASBESTOS BANKRUPTCIES
There are approximately sixty companies that have filed for bankruptcy
because of exposure to asbestos litigation. The total amount of money put in
trust for asbestos claimants has grown to over $10 billion,9 and the amount
currently in controversy exceeds $20 billion.1° The best estimates suggest
that there have been around 600,000 claims to date against over 6,000
defendants." Estimates of the number of future claimants vary from one to
three million with projected costs ranging from $200 billion to $265
billion.' 2
This is the context of the traditional bankruptcy approach to resolving
asbestos litigation. Once a company files for bankruptcy, there is a standard
model that the bankruptcy follows: there are readily recognizable parties,
procedures, issues, and information. Bargaining in accordance with this
standard process has generally resulted in a predictable range of outcomes.
A. Parties
When a company facing asbestos liabilities files for bankruptcy, the
critical players typically include the following:
1. Debtor
a. Management
b. Directors
c. Employer
2. General Creditors
a. Secured
b. Unsecured
3. Equity Holders
4. Insurers
5. Tort Claimants
6. Co-Defendants
1751-56 (2002).
9. STEPHEN J. CARROLL, ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS LITIGATION
COSTS AND COMPENSATION: AN INTERIM REPORT 17 (2002), available at http://www.rand.org.
10. Id.
II. Id.
12. Id.
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7. Public Interest Groups
The United States Trustee defines classes of parties and appoints separate
committees for the classes so that each interest group is appropriately
represented in the bankruptcy proceedings. 3 In normal bankruptcies, the
designation of committees and their memberships is routine. When there are
large unliquidated claims, however, the task of identifying true
representatives of those claims can be difficult. Because the funding for the
appointed committees comes from the debtor,' 4 and the development of a
plan of reorganization is dependant upon committee approval, there are
enormous advantages to having a committee for a given set of interests and
to being on that committee. As a result, there can be significant competition
among the various interested individuals and interests who are seeking to
maximum leverage during subsequent negotiations by having a committee
and by being in control of that committee.
The debtor is not a monolithic entity. It is composed of interest groups
that may compete with each other in the normal decision making process.
This is particularly true when pension funds are heavily invested in the
company's equity, thus allying employees and equity holders. At the same
time, the board of directors may not share the same interests as management,
particularly on a forward-going basis.
Likewise, there are financial creditors who have competing claims on
limited assets. The bankruptcy code establishes an absolute priority for
claims to assets under which higher-level claimants must be paid in full
before claimants with lower priority are paid.'5 Financing for the debtor in
possession comes first. Then there are administrative claims, secured
claims, guaranteed claims, and unsecured claims. Even within this hierarchy
there may be competitive advantages between groups.
Insurers are potentially among the most complicated groups. There may
be both settled and unsettled policies, provisions with and without
indemnity, and some policies that are liquidated while others have coverage
currently in place. Insurers who have made payments that have benefited
the debtor may have potential subrogation claims against the debtor. Co-
defendants may also seek contribution or indemnity for payments they have
made.
If the debtor company has a sufficiently high profile, there may be a
variety of other interest groups who wish to play a role in the bankruptcy.
Associations of injured parties, unions, consumer groups, and others may
attempt to represent their constituencies. This participation typically attracts
significant media attention.
The tort claimants are usually further divided into the following groups:
13. See II U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2000).
14. See II U.S.C. § 330(a) (2000); see also II U.S.C. § 1103 (2000).
15. See II U.S.C. § 507 (2000).
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1. Property Damage
2. Personal Injury
a. Malignancies
b. Non-Malignancies
3. Contract Claims
4. Foreign Claims
5. Future Claims
a. Near
b. Far
Property damage tort claimants are typically owners of buildings that
currently contain or have contained an asbestos product. 16 The extent of
these claims relates to the identity and quantity of the specific products sold
by the debtor. In some cases, the United States Trustee appoints a separate
committee for property damage claims. 17 In others, they are included with
other tort claims or with general unsecured creditors.' 8
Personal injury tort claims involve individuals who have suffered
physical harm from exposure to asbestos. These asbestos-related diseases
include malignancies such as mesothelioma, lung cancer or other cancers,
and non-malignancies such as asbestosis and pleural disease.' 9
There are also tort claims from individuals who contracted to settle their
claims prior to the bankruptcy filing but who were not paid.2 ° Arguably,
their rights against the debtor are based upon contract rather than tort.2'
Whether these claimants have tort or contract claims is a decision for the
bankruptcy court.
Many asbestos debtors have sold their products overseas, and persons in
foreign countries have claims that are viable either in their own jurisdiction
or in the United States. 22 Although the debtor is generally eager to satisfy
those claims as well, so that the entire asbestos liability of the company can
be resolved, there are often jurisdictional complications. This is particularly
true if the debtor has foreign assets that can be jeopardized by new
claimants.
Future claims are treated somewhat differently. A "futures
representative" is appointed by the bankruptcy court upon motion by the
debtor and agreement by the various committees.2 3  The futures
16. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Chicago v. A, C and S, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 580, 583 (I1. 1989)
(explaining that claimant school districts were suing for removal of asbestos).
17. See In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc., No. 01-10578 (D. Del. Oct. 28, 2003) (notice of
appointment of Official Committee of Asbestos Property Claimants).
18. See, e.g., In re Owens Corning, No. 00-3837 (order establishing case management
procedures for asbestos-related property damage claims).
19. CARROLL, supra note 9, at 17.
20. See, e.g., Rovida v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., No. 00-10992, 2002 WL 1874863, at *1 (E.D.
La. Aug. 13, 2002).
21. Seeid.at*3.
22. See generally In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc., 282 B.R. 301 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002).
23. I1 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(i) (2000) (stating that a "legal representative for the purpose of
protecting the rights of persons that might subsequently assert demands" must be appointed); see
also In re USG Corp., 290 B.R. 223, 224 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (giving order appointing a "futures
236
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representative has responsibility for insuring that the rights of all future
claimants are satisfied in the asbestos bankruptcy2 4  Those claims can
include near futures-those who know that they have been exposed to an
asbestos product, but who have no current injury-and far futures-those
who are currently unaware of their asbestos exposure.25
B. Procedure
The critical procedural steps in the life of an asbestos bankruptcy
include the following:
1. Stay of Litigation
2. Plan of Reorganization
3. Exclusivity
4. Disclosure Statement
5. Valuation
6. Vote
7. Confirmation
8. Article IIlI/Article I Responsibilities
Asbestos bankruptcies follow a procedural "life cycle." Upon filing for
bankruptcy, a debtor first seeks a stay of all litigation pending against it in its
first day orders. The goal of this stay is to allow the debtor's limited funds
to be divided fairly among all claimants according to bankruptcy code
priorities rather than on a first-come, first-serve basis.
The procedure established in the bankruptcy code provides that the
debtor has the exclusive right to propose a plan of reorganization2 6 It is this
plan that defines the rights and duties of both the debtor and the claimants
and sets forth what must occur before the "reorganized" company can
emerge from bankruptcy. The plan allocates all assets based upon a
determination of all liabilities. Therefore, it must comply with the priority
rules in the bankruptcy code, which mandate that parties with a higher
priority be paid in full before parties with a lower priority can be paid at all.
A synopsis of the plan, known as the disclosure statement, must be sent to
the members of each class of interested parties for a vote.27
In order for a plan of reorganization to be confirmed, there must be a
positive vote of fifty percent in number and two-thirds in value from each
voting class.28 The exception to this rule is that classes lower in payment
representative").
24. See I I U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(i).
25. See generally In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996).
26. See II U.S.C. § 1121(b) (2000).
27. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (2000).
28. II U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2000). But see II U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb) (2000) (requiring
that "a separate class or classes of the claimants whose claims are to be addressed by a trust" be
established, that the claimants have the ability to vote on the proposed plan of reorganization, and
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priority than any higher class not paid in full can be forced to accept the plan
of reorganization by a process known as a "cram down."2 9 Secured claims
are paid first, then unsecured claims, and finally equity holders.30 For
example, if the classes of claimants for secured and unsecured creditors vote
in favor of the plan of reorganization, and the unsecured creditors are not
paid in full, the plan can be confirmed even though the equity class rejects
the plan.
In the event, however, that there is no agreement among the priority
creditors, the procedure for confirming a plan of reorganization becomes
more complicated. The contesting committees can challenge the values of
the debtor's assets and each other's claims.31 So, for example, a lower
priority committee might argue that the debtor has a larger value so that
there is more of a remainder for its claims after the higher priority claims are
paid in full. A committee might inflate the value of its own claims and
deflate the value of other committees' claims in order to gain a larger share
of the available assets. In addition, the committees can contest each issue in
the proceedings in an attempt to create bargaining power and negotiate a
plan of reorganization that is more favorable to them.
Each committee's goal is to establish sufficient bargaining power to
assure that its claims receive as great a share as possible of the available
assets as possible. Those with less bargaining power still have "legal aid."
The debtor funds all litigation efforts, even if those efforts are doomed to
failure. Given the time value of money, transaction costs, and the
opportunity costs of a debtor in bankruptcy, the ability to delay the
confirmation of a plan of reorganization creates bargaining power in itself.
An Article I bankruptcy judge oversees this process.32 Appeals from the
bankruptcy judge's decisions go to an Article III federal district court
judge.33 In addition, the final release of the asbestos claims must be decided
by the Article III judge.34
C. Issues and Information
The prominent legal and factual issues in asbestos bankruptcies typically
are the following:
1. Scope of Stay of Litigation
2. Bar Date
3. Claim Form
4. Claim Allowance
that the plan be approved "by at least 75% of those voting, in favor of the plan"). This provision of
II U.S.C. § 524 applies to asbestos claimants.
29. See II U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2000) (making statements indicating use of a "cram down").
30. See id.
31. See II U.S.C. § 502 (2000).
32. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 151 (designation of bankruptcy courts), 152 (appointment of bankruptcy
judges), 157, 1334 (jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases and proceedings) (2000).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 158 (2000).
34. See II U.S.C. § 524(g)(2) (2000).
238
[Vol. 31: 233, 2004] Section 534(g) Without Bankruptcy
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
5. Estimation
6. Challenged Transfers or Preferences
7. Exclusivity
8. Voting Procedures
8. Section 524(g)
9. Claims Resolution Facility
The bankruptcy code provides for the bankruptcy court to stay all
pending litigation against the debtor.35 If there are entities related to the
debtor that also have litigation pending against them, they may attempt to
have that litigation stayed as well because their litigation is "related to" the
debtor's welfare and might adversely affect the debtor's assets.36 The scope
of the stay can, therefore, become hotly contested depending upon the
debtor's corporate structure and the amount of pending litigation.
Issues regarding the claim form and the deadline for claimants to file a
proof of claim (commonly referred to as the "bar date") hinge on the
availability of information concerning the values of the creditors' claims.37
For trade and financial creditors, the amount of the claim is typically readily
available. However, interest on debts and the nature of securities can often
be problematic. In other instances, there can be disputes concerning the
validity of claims.
The type of information needed to assess the value of personal injury
and property damage claims arising from asbestos exposure is much more
difficult to obtain. 38 These claim values are generally based upon the results
of past trials or settlements in the tort system but can vary considerably
depending upon the nature of the alleged harm, the jurisdiction, and other
factors.39 Just as important as the value of claims is the number of asbestos
claimants who will actually file a claim and the validity of the filed claims.40
As is the case with many mass torts, there is substantial elasticity in the
filing of claims.
41
There are several methods for estimating the number and value of the
asbestos claims that will eventually be filed.42 There can be extrapolation
from historic values and a projection of future filings.43 Alternatively, there
can be a number of generic challenges to establish new threshold standards
35. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000).
36. See id.
37. See II U.S.C. § 502(b)(9) (2000); see also BANKR. R. 3002.
38. See RICHARD B. SABOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD
BANKRUPTCY (1991).
39. See CARROLL, supra note 9, at 2.
40. See McGovern, supra note 8, at 1722, 1728, 1750.
41. In re Babcock & Wilcox Co., No. 00-558, 2001 WL 1204074, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct 11, 2001);
see also In re USG Corp., 290 B.R. 223, 224 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
42. See In re USG Corp., 290 B.R. at 224-27 (large volumes of known and unknown claimants).
43. See id. at 226 (discussing various alternatives to evaluating the claims).
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for maintaining viable claims. These types of challenges-Daubert
hearings"4 and motions for summary judgment4 -follow both the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence and have been
proposed in a number of asbestos bankruptcies. 6 There is also the
possibility of a claims allowance process by which claims can be challenged
individually to determine their validity.41
The bottom line for the bar date, claim form, claim allowance, and
estimation issues is that the court must establish the total liability for all the
debtor's asbestos claims in order to insure that all similarly situated creditors
are treated equally. Thus, an appropriate allocation of the debtor's resources
cannot be made, nor can the feasibility of a plan of reorganization be
assured, without an estimate of all the debtor's liabilities. The higher the
asbestos liabilities, the greater the percentage of the debtor's assets that
asbestos claimants will receive, and vice versa.
Another typical area of controversy involves contesting the debtor's
transfers of assets prior to the bankruptcy filing. Some of these contested
transfers may involve asset sales that occurred long before the advent of
bankruptcy. a  Payments made to asbestos personal injury claimants
immediately prior to the bankruptcy filing may also be contested.49
As indicated above, the debtor has the exclusive right to propose a plan
of reorganization unless that exclusivity is lifted by the court.50 This right
gives the debtor great bargaining power to veto any provisions of a proposed
reorganization plan that it does not like. In the event that the debtor cannot
propose a viable plan because of a deadlock among the committees, the
court can lift the debtor's exclusivity privilege, allow all parties to file plans
of reorganization, and have them sent out for a vote.5 Since the debtor does
not have a "vote," this lifting of exclusivity shifts the bargaining power
rather drastically.
The procedures for voting on a plan of reorganization are traditionally
rather simple: one dollar, one vote; one claimant, one vote. 2 In the case of
asbestos personal injury claimants, however, the dollar value of actual
claims can vary considerably.53 Since there is no individual evaluation of
claims prior to a vote on the plan of reorganization, courts recently have
44. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
45. See BANKR. R. 7056 (stating that FED. R. Civ. P. 56 applies to adversary proceedings in
bankruptcy).
46. W.R. Grace's Supplemental Brief Regarding Procedures for the Litigation of the Common
Personal Injury Liability Issues, In re W.R. Grace & Co., No. 01-01139 (June 21, 2002).
47. See I I U.S.C. § 502 (2000); see also BANKR. R. 3002, 3003.
48. See II U.S.C. § 548 (2000) (discussing fraudulent conveyances).
49. See II U.S.C. § 547 (discussing preferences).
50. See II U.S.C. § 1121 (2000) (stating that only the debtor may file a plan of reorganization
until after 120 days from the date of the order for relief is entered).
51. Id.
52. See II U.S.C. § I 128(c) (2000); see also In re Fighter Ltd., 118 F.3d 635 (9th Cir. 1997);
Concord Square Apartments v. Otham Prop., Inc., 174 B.R. 71, 74 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994); In re
Gilbert, 104 B.R. 206, 211 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989).
53. CARROLL, supra note 9, at 9.
240
[Vol. 31: 233, 2004] Section 53 4 (g) Without Bankruptcy
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
allowed each claimant to indicate the type of disease'claim the individual is
asserting and have assigned that individual a voting value equal to the value
of the claim in the eventual plan of asset distribution.54
Section 524(g) of the bankruptcy code is another unique aspect of
asbestos bankruptcies. After the first few asbestos bankruptcies were
resolved, a shadow of potential future asbestos liability remained over the
reorganized debtors. 55 The risk of future liability reduced their marketplace
values to a sufficient degree such that Congress passed a statute specifically
to insure that no overhang of asbestos liability remained for the company
emerging from bankruptcy.
Section 524(g) provides that if the following:
(a) a trust is created which assumes the present and future asbestos
personal injury and/or property damage liabilities of the debtor;5 6 and
(b) the trust is funded in whole or in part by securities of the debtor and
obligations of the debtor to make future payments, including
dividends;57 and
(c) the trust will own, or by exercise of rights granted under the plan will
be entitled to own a majority of the voting stock of the debtor, parent, or
subsidiary, if specified contingencies occur;58 and
(d) the trust will pay the present and future asbestos claims against the
debtor;59 and
(e) the present and future claims will all be valued and paid in
substantially the same manner;6° and
(f) the plan is approved by at least 75% of all asbestos claimants who
vote;61 and
(g) a futures representative is appointed; 61
then the planned discharge provisions can include an injunction issued by
the district court barring the following claims:
(a) for the debtor's asbestos torts against the reorganized debtor;63 and
54. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 40 B.R. 219 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
55. See Jeff Claubaugh, W.R. Grace Falls on Senate Snag, WASHINGTON BUS. J., July 10, 2003,
available at http://washington.bizjournals.com/washingtonlstories/2003/07/07/daily30.html; Nelson
Antosh, Halliburton Hunkers Down to Fend Off Asbestos Litigation, HoUs. CHRON., Feb. 22, 2002,
available at http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/business/1268264.html; David Brinkerhoff,
Asbestos-Plagued Shares Up on Liability Limit Talk, at
http://biz.yahoo.com/rc/030916/manufacturing-stocks-l.html (September 16, 2003); Nat Worden,
Stocks With Potential Asbestos Liability Slide, at
http://www.thestreet.com/_yahoo/markets/stockwatch/10099232.html (July 10, 2003).
56. II U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(I) (2000).
57. II U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(I).
58. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(III).
59. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(IV).
60. I1 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V).
61. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb).
62. I1 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(i).
63. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(I)(A)-(B).
(b) against third-parties who were past and present affiliates of the
debtor, officers or directors of the debtor or a related party, insurers of
the debtor, lenders to a purchaser of the debtor who have provided or
agreed to provide benefits to the trust in amounts that make such
protection fair and equitable. 64
In addition, any enforcement or construction of the injunction must be done
by the same district court.65
The protections of § 524(g) are greatly valued by the capital markets
and have become a prerequisite for a successful asbestos bankruptcy. One
effect of this development has been to give asbestos personal injury
claimants, as a group, and a large number of claimants with less serious
injuries in particular, a de facto veto over any plan of reorganization. This
veto power is reinforced by the applicability of state substantive law to the
personal injury claims.66 This phenomenal increase in tort claimants'
bargaining power has altered the traditional negotiation process, and
adjusting to the new reality has been extremely difficult for some of the
other involved creditors.
The assets devoted to asbestos claimants are typically placed in a trust
67
with an accompanying claims resolution facility designed to evaluate each
asbestos personal injury or property damage claim and pay them
accordingly. 68 The precise trust distribution plan, which assigns values to
categories of claims, can also be controversial, particularly regarding the
relative allocations of assets between malignancies and non-malignancies,69
foreign and domestic claims,70 and personal injury and property damage
claims.71
D. The Bargaining Process
The bargaining process in asbestos bankruptcies is typically quite
extended, lasting from four to six years. 72 The mere passage of so much
time lends itself to much mischief because of inevitable temporal changes in
bargaining power and party alliances. The negotiation process often
becomes a game in which the parties strategically vie for power and
position. The sources of bargaining power include committee appointments,
some of which do not occur until late in the case; decisions by the
bankruptcy or federal district judge on the multiple issues discussed above;
64. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(a)(i)()-(IV); see also 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(b)(i).
65. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(A).
66. Raleigh v. Ill. Dep't. of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000); Butner v. United States, 440 U.S.
48, 55 (1979).
67. See II U.S.C. § 524(g) (2000).
68. See II U.S.C. § 524(g).
69. See In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 285 B.R. 864 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002); In re Babcock
& Wilcox Co., No. 00-10992, 2002 WL 1874836, at *I (E.D. La. Aug 3,2002).
70. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 297 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
71. In re Celotex Corp., 227 F.3d 1336 (11 th Cir. 2000); In re Nat'l Gypsum Co., 2002 WL
1359715, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 18, 2002).
72. See Kane v. Johns-Manvillle Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 639-41(2d Cir. 1988).
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scientific developments on evidence that may or may not be made available
during the course of the proceedings; and legislative changes.
At the same time, parties may change their bargaining positions because
of internal disputes or because of changing attitudes toward the relative
value of the debtor's assets. Typically those assets include cash, stocks,
warrants, debts, insurance, and investment, opportunities. Variations in
interest rates, changes in investment opportunities, and other changes in
value or risk may result in commensurate changes in the bargaining postures
of the parties.
The constantly changing alliances among the parties are key factors in
the negotiation process. It is important for each party to form advantageous
alliances with competing parties in the process. Yet, those alliances are
rarely stable for long periods of time. Plaintiffs' counsel representing
malignancies, for example, may potentially have common ground with the
debtor, property damage claimants, financial creditors, the futures
representative, or other personal injury claimants. Given the multiple parties
and multiple interests, the bargaining process in asbestos bankruptcies has
many facets. Because of the extended amount of time for negotiation, each
party tends to continuously seek a more advantageous outcome, and interests
and alliances shift.
At the end of the day, the bargaining power created by the bankruptcy
code through the absolute priority rules and § 524(g) drives the broad outline
of most asbestos bankruptcy resolutions. At the margin, however, there can
be quite different outcomes based upon the negotiation skills of the
respective parties.
E. Outcomes
The outcome of any bankruptcy involves complete or partial resolution
of the following issues:
1. Equity Percentage
2. Secured Debt Percentage
3. Trade Debt Percentage
4. Unsecured Financial Debt Percentage
5. Tort Debt Percentage
6. Insurance
7. Trust and Claims Resolution Facility
The resolutions of asbestos bankruptcies have been relatively uniform,
in large part because of the requirements of § 524(g).73  Generally,
companies do not file for bankruptcy until their asbestos liabilities exceed
their assets. Given the priority of payment rules, which dictate that equity
holders are paid only after secured and unsecured creditors are paid in full,
73. See II U.S.C. § 524(g) (2000).
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there are generally few, if any, assets remaining for the shareholders. In
some instances, equity holders have been able to receive funds out of the
debtor's money warrants. The shareholders' bargaining power is typically
derivative of the debtor's exclusivity rights, the ability to suppress the value
of the tort claims, or the means to inflict sufficient costs to encourage a
beneficial settlement.
Because secured creditors come first, they usually are paid in full unless
the debtor is also financially bankrupt. In that event, there is a conflict
between the bargaining power provided by the secured creditor's priority
status and the bargaining power provided by the unsecured claimants' §
524(g) veto power.7 4 Because the unsecured financial creditors must be
treated equally with similarly situated unsecured asbestos claimants, they
have additional bargaining power.
Most frequently, negotiations focus on the relative values of the
unsecured financial creditors and the unsecured tort claimants. As indicated
above, the contested issues involve preferences, claims valuation and
estimation, and the valuation of corporate assets that are subject to financial
and asbestos claims. In addition, there can be significant corporate
governance issues. If the in pari passu requirements are to be met by giving
a "strip"-a percentage of the cash, debt, and equity remaining in the
debtor-to the financial and asbestos creditors, there may be debate
concerning the rights of minority shareholders. These corporate governance
issues can be addressed by the composition of the board or by giving
minority shareholders specific rights.
In many asbestos bankruptcies, there are insurance policies that are
arguably available to fund some of the asbestos tort claims. These insurance
policies may raise issues of assignability and questions as to when payment
is triggered. In addition, the policy provisions may create a duty on the
insurance company to cooperate. Tort claimants typically wish to assign
such insurance policies to a trust, deem the entire amount of the policies due
upon the insured's filing of bankruptcy, and to process the claims without
regard to the insurers. Conversely, the insurance companies typically
contest such assignment, demand participation in the claims resolution
process, and insist that claims be paid only as the insurers determine they are
valid.
The assets made available to tort claimants are normally placed into a
trust with trustees nominated by the claimants. Individual claims are then
evaluated by a claims resolution facility. The facility's procedures are
governed by a trust distribution plan (TDP), which is part of the overall
reorganization plan. Usually, there are defined medical and exposure
criteria that place the claimants into a series of categories. Each disease
category is assigned a range of values, and a grid is then used to guide the
facility in its analysis of each claim. Based on the grid value of each claim,
the claims resolution facility makes an offer of payment to each individual
claimant. The claimant may contest the offer using alternative dispute
74. See id.
[Vol. 31: 233, 2004] Section 534(g) Without Bankruptcy
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
resolution or may evengo to trial. If there is insufficient funding to pay all
claims in full, each claim is paid a percentage of its grid value in order for all
present and future claimants to be treated equally.
The outcome of most asbestos bankruptcies is as follows:
1. Equity - relatively small participation
2. Secured Debt - paid in full or in kind
3. Trade Debt - paid in full or equivalently with other financial debt
4. Unsecured Financial Debt - paid in pari passou with the unsecured
tort debt
5. Unsecured Tort Personal Injury Claims - paid at least 50.1% of the
equity in the trust and claims resolution facility
6. Unsecured Tort Property Damage Claims - paid in pari passou with
the personal injury claims
7. Futures - paid equivalently to the current tort personal injury claims.
II. PREPACKAGED ASBESTOS BANKRUPTCIES
The Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.75 mandatory limited fund class action
was the precursor to prepackaged asbestos bankruptcies.76 In Ortiz, the
asbestos company, Fibreboard, had limited assets plus an insurance policy
arguably covering some of its asbestos personal injury liability. 77 Counsel
representing personal injury plaintiffs negotiated with Fibreboard and its
insurance carrier: (1) a settlement of pending cases; (2) a class action
settlement for future cases; and (3) a default payment to Fibreboard from the
insurance carrier in the event that the class action was not upheld.78 The
current cases were resolved.79 The class action provided for both a lump
sum payment into a trust fund and a trust distribution plan with a schedule of
payments for claimants suffering from various asbestos-related diseases.8 s
At the fairness hearing on this settlement, the trial court approved the
mandatory limited fund class action over the objection of counsel for a
minority of the plaintiffs.8 ' The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, but
the United States Supreme Court reversed. 2 This reversal triggered the
default provisions, and Fibreboard received a lump sum payment from the
75. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
76. See id.
77. Id. at 822-23.
78. Id. at 823-25.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 824-25, 27.
81. Id. at 827.
82. Id. at815.
insurance carrier.8 3  Fiberboard was subsequently purchased by Owens
Corning-another asbestos manufacturer. 84
Ortiz had been preceded by Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,85
another attempt to bring closure to asbestos litigation by the use of a class
action. Amchem involved a consortium of defendants who used a class
action to settle their inventory of current claims and to offer payments based
upon a predefined grid for all future claimants.86 Any plaintiff desiring not
to participate in the settlement grid program was given the opportunity to opt
out of the settlement class and proceed normally in the tort system. 87 The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court both
reversed.88
Ortiz and Amchem eliminated, as a practical matter, asbestos companies'
attempts to use the class action device to provide finality for corporations
involved in protracted personal injury asbestos litigation.89 After Ortiz and
Anchem, the remaining legal vehicle that can bring these defendants finality
is bankruptcy and its § 524(g) protections.90
Most companies are reluctant to file for bankruptcy except as a last
resort. They wait until their assets have been diminished so greatly that
bankruptcy is the only alternative. When, however, it is possible to pre-
negotiate a plan of reorganization so that a company can file for bankruptcy
knowing in advance what the outcome will be and go through the
bankruptcy process quickly, then bankruptcy becomes a more viable option.
A prepackaged bankruptcy occurs, then, when a company negotiates a plan
of reorganization, sends out a disclosure statement, and conducts a vote all
prior to actually filing for bankruptcy.
A. The Process of a Prepackaged Bankruptcy
The parties, issues, and information are roughly the same in any
bankruptcy. The statutory procedures are also identical. There are a number
of case-specific issues, however, that must be resolved prior to the filing of a
successful prepackaged bankruptcy:
1. Confidentiality
2. Plaintiffs' "Committee"
3. Futures Representative
4. Stay of Litigation
5. Current Cases
6. Trigger Date
83. See id.
84. OWENS CORNING, INC., 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 30 (1997), available at http://www.corporate-
ir.net/mediafiles/otcbb/owenq.ob/reports/97ar.pdf.
85. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 815 (1999); Amchem, 521 U.S. at 591.
90. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2000); Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 815; Amchem, 521 U.S. at 591.
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7. Security
8. Gap Cases
9. Future Cases
10. Equivalency
11. Asbestos Values
a. Dollars
b. Category
12. Definition of Cases
13. Product Identification
14. Medical Criteria
15. Trust Composition
16. Claims Processing
17. Funding and Flow Rate
18. Insurance
Because there is no formal mechanism to oversee the negotiation of a
prepackaged bankruptcy, organization of the early discussions is difficult.
One of the most troublesome aspects of the lack of a formalized structure for
the negotiations is the necessity of confidentiality. Premature release of
information regarding the possibility of a bankruptcy filing could adversely
affect both the stock price of any interested corporation and its approach to
resolving its asbestos liabilities. At the same time, corporations have an
obligation to disclose material changes to the investing public.
One of the key issues that must be resolved in negotiation of a
prepackaged bankruptcy is an agreement concerning the total value of the
present and future asbestos liabilities. One approach is to analyze the history
of a company's settlements and trials and use those statistics to predict
remaining liabilities. Naturally, defendants are reluctant to share such
information with counsel for plaintiffs who are currently suing them. The
dilemma is how to share this information without jeopardizing the future
defense and negotiation of claims in the event that there is no agreement on
the prepackaged bankruptcy. There are any number of potential solutions,
one of which is to hire a neutral expert who can insulate the data while
providing independent verification of aggregate information crucial to
estimating the overall value of claims.
The actual negotiators will typically be (1) representatives of the
company, (2) representatives of the insurers, (3) the plaintiffs' bar, and (4)
the futures representative. The representatives of the putative debtor are
readily identifiable and are paid by the debtor. If there are insurers involved,
they are similarly situated. 9' The plaintiffs' bar is represented by
approximately twenty-five lawyers who serve on the various asbestos
bankruptcy committees. Roughly seven to fifteen of those lawyers can
effectively speak for all their peers. If those seven to fifteen lawyers can
91. See II U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B).
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agree among themselves on the details of a prepackaged bankruptcy, there is
a substantial likelihood that there will be no critical opposition from the
plaintiffs to an eventual plan of reorganization. Those seven to fifteen
lawyers are currently members of a committee that represents itself as
available to negotiate prepackaged bankruptcies. There is a potential
problem, however, in the fact that the United States Trustee is not bound to
choose precisely the same lawyers for each bankruptcy negotiation
committee; this lack of certainty can create substantial dislocation in the plan
approval process.
There is no generally accepted way of paying these lawyers for their
efforts in negotiating a plan of reorganization other than through their
respective clients.92 Because the attorneys' volumes of clients vary
considerably, one option for compensating counsel and experts for services
that benefit all of the claimants is using the multi-district litigation model of
a common benefit fund.93 Under this approach, the debtor establishes a fund
to be used to pay front-end expenses and counsel fees as approved by the
district court. Both financial and statistical experts are similarly paid. The
common benefit fund can also be used to pay mediators, facilitators, and
arbitrators as necessary.
Likewise, the futures representative can be paid from the same fund.94
The selection of the futures representative is problematic because having a
weak futures representative is in the interests of both the debtor and the
current claimants. Yet, under the bankruptcy code, they are precisely the
parties who select the futures representative (subject to court approval). Any
selection of a futures representative in a prepackaged bankruptcy must, by
necessity, be approved by a court.95
All debtors desire a stay of litigation pending resolution of the
prepackaged bankruptcy negotiations, but these negotiations occur prior to
any filing with a court. As a result, there is usually only an informal stay,
which is subject to the usual hazards associated with informality.
Notwithstanding an agreement by the parties to a stay of limited duration,
there needs to be some jurisdictional hook in order to allow a court to issue
an injunction staying litigation.
The first issue to be resolved is the trigger dates to be used in identifying
three different types of cases: those liquidated prior to the bankruptcy filing,
the "gap cases" filed after that trigger date but before the effective date, and
the "future" cases. These three categories of cases have been handled using
three fundamentally different approaches because there are several
92. See, e.g., McGovern, supra note 8, at 1745 (stating that "since Amchein and ... Ortiz ....
there has been no further judicial effort to coerce future asbestos plaintiffs into a predefined mode").
93. See, e.g., In re Salzer Hip Prosthesis and Knee Prosthesis Liability Litig., 268 F. Supp. 2d
907 (N.D. Ohio 2003); HEMLER, ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS
15-37 (2000); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 33.24 et seq., (1995).
94. See I I U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(b)(ii)(v).
95. See II U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(i) (stating that if, under a plan of reorganization, a trust is to be
used in connection with an injunction, such injunction is valid and enforceable if the court appoints a
legal representative for future claimants).
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competing interests that must be served in accommodating them. The
unpaid current and gap cases have the right to vote in the bankruptcy, and
75% of them must be satisfied that their payments are guaranteed in order
for them to vote in favor of the plan of reorganization.96 The future cases
must be treated equivalently to the current cases in order to comply with §
524(g). 97 This creates a conflict of interest between the voters and the non-
voters.
The company, on the other hand, typically will not guarantee the
payment of current claims unless it is certain that the prepackaged
bankruptcy will be approved. The company knows that it has to pay even
arguably valid current claims in order to get a favorable vote because even
the most marginal claims are assigned one vote. However, the company
does not want to have to pay those types of claims in the future. This creates
a conflict between the company and the current and gap claims, as well as
conflict over the requirement that all claims, even future claims, be treated
equivalently.
Among plaintiffs, the lawyers who represent principally clients suffering
from malignancies understand that current non-malignancy plaintiffs must
be paid in order to achieve the requisite vote, but they do not want to see less
serious cases dilute payments to the malignancies in the future. This creates
a conflict between malignancies and non-malignancies and also between
current and gap non-malignancies and future non-malignancies.
Finally, there is the problem of setting a trigger date that draws the line
between current and gap claims. As soon as the trigger date is announced,
many new entrants attempt to file before the deadline in order to be current
claimants, an arguably more advantageous position than being a gap
claimant. However, unlimited new claimants may dilute the funds available
for immediate payment to the current claimants.
The approaches to reconciling these competing interests are both varied
and ingenious. One technique is to create a pre-petition settlement trust,
which is funded before the bankruptcy filing and pays a percentage of a
predetermined, liquidated value of current claims. The unpaid portion of the
liquidated value of these cases, known as the "stubb" payment, is paid from
a second trust created after bankruptcy. This second, post bankruptcy trust
pays all of the stubb payments on current claims, the entire amount of the
gap claims, and future claims. The stubb payment is equivalent in value to
the entire payment amount for gap and future cases. The net effect of this
approach is to guarantee a substantial payment to the current plaintiffs, to
allow current plaintiffs to vote because their claims have not been fully paid,
to set a trigger that limits dilution by gap claims, and to treat all the
remaining cases equivalently. However, one problem with this approach is
96. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(bb).
97. See II U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(v).
that the pre-petition settlement trust is typically larger on a per claim basis
than the post bankruptcy trust. Equivalency is determined only within the
confines of the post bankruptcy trust, not as between the two trusts together.
The justification for this approach is that the company could have made
settlement payments prior to filing for bankruptcy, so equivalency is
required only for the claims which are paid post petition.
A second approach is to liquidate the current claims before the
bankruptcy filing, but pay them, along with the gap and future claims, from
a post bankruptcy trust. That trust is bound to pay the pre-bankruptcy
liquidated amounts for the current claims, but would use a separate,
negotiated grid for the gap and future claims. Again, there is arguably an
equivalency problem, but it can be asserted that all post petition claims are
handled in substantially the same fashion.
A third solution is to have three trusts: a pre-petition settlement trust for
the malignancies, a pre-petition litigation trust for the lower value cases, and
a post bankruptcy trust for only malignancy and serious asbestotics gap and
future cases. The argument here is that the current, gap, future malignancy,
and serious asbestotic cases are paid identically. The less serious, pre-
petition cases receive nuisance payments and because there are no
provisions to pay any gap or future less serious claims, they will never be
filed at all. Therefore, there will never be an equivalency problem.
There are also a variety of other techniques that could be used to solve
the equivalency problem. There could be a "collar" on future claims, which
would assure that the bulk of the money went to malignancy and serious
asbestotic claimants. Under this scenario, all the higher value claims would
actually be paid equivalently and the lower value claims would only be paid
if money was available. One relief valve would be to allow claims not fully
paid to enter the tort system, although there would be restraints on damage
awards and payment velocity.
Another approach would be for experts to project that all payments to
current and future claimants would be at 100% of full value. If all claimants
were paid 100%, there would be equivalency by definition. If a large part of
the assets in a bankruptcy trust is equity in the new asbestos-liability-free
entity emerging from bankruptcy, financial experts could take into account
the increased value of the post bankruptcy equity and predict that there
would be sufficient funds to pay all claims in full.
If there is a parent entity that wishes to benefit from § 524(g) protection,
there could be a range of funding mechanisms available to a post bankruptcy
trust. An evergreen trust that is continuously replenished with annual caps is
one possibility. This type of trust would arguably promote equivalency in
the payments made over time while providing substantial front-end
payments to current claimants. If insurance is involved, the trust could be
valued accordingly.
The fundamental dilemma of the prepackaged bankruptcy is illustrated
by these mechanisms. The law requires that all claimants be paid the same
regardless of their categorization; all claimants must get the same percentage
of their claim's value. The current claimants may not agree to vote in favor
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of a plan of reorganization unless they are comfortable that they are getting
close to normal litigation values or slightly reduced values with greater
velocity. The company, on the other hand, does not want to pay full
litigation values for both current and future claimants. It will not agree to
this process unless it is getting, at the least, some type of discount on normal
litigation claim values or preferred treatment for one of its related entities.
The pressure, then, is on the gap and future claims to bear the bulk of any
discount, a scenario which creates the potential for unfairness.
Great scrutiny must be given, therefore, to the bankruptcy trust and the
trust distribution plan. The trust distribution plan must establish the
eligibility including the following: the medical and exposure criteria that
make claimants eligible for payment, the value to be paid, and the
methodology for making those payments. There is typically a payment grid
setting forth the relative values of malignancies and non-malignancies. 98
There is usually also an option for claimants to be paid lower amounts
quickly or higher amounts that are subject to individual review. In some
plans, there is a predefined minimum percentage, or "collar," on the amount
of the trust to be used for malignancy claims. This prevents an increased
number of non-malignancy filings from diluting the money available for the
more serious cases.
The trust distribution plan has threshold medical criteria that claimants
must satisfy to receive any payment at all. 99 There must also be categories
of proof for product identification, which entitle a claimant to be paid either
a standard amount for credible evidence of product exposure or a greater
amount for compelling evidence of product exposure.
The organization and governance of the trust, the appointment of
trustees, the selection of a trust advisory committee, and the nomination of
members of boards of directors, if appropriate, must also be decided. In
addition, the administration of the claims resolution facility must be
described in great detail.
The funding mechanism for the trust is one of the more difficult issues
to be resolved. Section 524(g) requires 50. 1 % ownership of the debtor if the
funding is provided by equity.7 0 There can also be various other financial
instruments involved, such as an evergreen trust with defined flow rates.""°
Insurance assets can also be put into the trust, assuming they can be assigned
98. See generally McGovern, supra note 8, at 1747 (discussing malignant versus non-malignant
cases).
99. See, e.g., Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act, H.R. 1283, 106th Cong. § 201 (1999)
(establishing medical criteria for plaintiffs); McGovem, supra note 8, at 1751 nn.103, 104 and
accompanying text (discussing probable medical threshold criteria).
100. See I I U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(HI).
101. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (establishing, as
the central provision of a reorganization plan, an evergreen trust to assume all asbestos liabilities of
the corporation).
and that the trust distribution plan does not violate the terms of the insurance
contract. Often insurance carriers would prefer to commute their policies
and receive the benefits of § 524(g) protection prior to the effective date of
the bankruptcy. On other occasions, the insurers prefer to contest issues
related to the policies.
B. Varieties of Circumstances
Notwithstanding the similarities in the process for virtually all
prepackaged asbestos bankruptcies, there are a number of different financial
and corporate packages found among debtors that can alter the negotiation
process:
1. Insurance Assets Only
a. Negotiation With Carriers
b. Negotiation Without Carriers
2. Debtor With Assets Plus Insurance
a. Current Claimant Trust
b. All Post Bankruptcy Payments
3. Parent or Other Non-Debtor and Debtor With Assets
Where the debtor has few assets other than insurance, there is typically
an effort to use the prepackaged bankruptcy negotiations to create an
advantageous bargaining posture for the resulting trust in any litigation
against the insurance carriers. Knowing this tactic, some carriers attempt to
derail the bankruptcy negotiations or attempt to prevent confirmation, either
parallel to negotiations or as an independent strategy.
In a situation where the debtor has substantial assets, the negotiations
tend to focus on discussions between current and future claimants and the
reorganized debtor. Those negotiations can fall apart if there are significant
outliers or if a normal "free-fall" bankruptcy is an attractive alternative.
When insurance is also a factor, the overall plan may be so complex that
there are simply too many complications to consummate a plan.
In the event that the subject corporation has a solvent parent or other
entity that desires § 524(g) protection, the amount of potential funding can
increase; however, the attractiveness of leaving the entire corporate entity in
the tort system altogether also increases. 0 2 In addition to the larger number
of players who must agree and the larger number of issues that must be
resolved, there are also larger expectations that must be met.
III. SECTION 524(g) WITHOUT BANKRUPTCY
The purpose of this proposed legislative model is to provide § 524(g)
type protections to asbestos defendants without the necessity of their filing
for bankruptcy. These protections would be available to entities capable of
negotiating with asbestos personal injury plaintiffs to create a court-
approved trust that is immediately funded or is funded with a renewing
102. See McGovern, supra note 8, at 1755.
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mechanism that will provide sufficient assets to pay future asbestos
claimants in full. The statute would provide, in effect, a structure for
settlement, not litigation, of asbestos liability. The critical elements in the
legislation are the following:
1. Qualifications for Use
2. Jurisdiction
3. Stay
a. Length
b. Scope
4. Plaintiffs' Counsel
a. Appointment
b. Compensation
c. Experts
5. Insurance Counsel
6. Futures Representative
a. Selection
b. Veto
7. Fund
a. Definition
b. Security
c. Tax
8. Trust Distribution Plan
a. Equivalency
i. Current Claims
ii. Future Claims
b. Administrator
c. Grid
d. Collar
e. Medical Criteria
f. Exposure Criteria
g. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
h. Access to Tort System
g. Punitive Damages
h. Medical Monitoring
i. Green Card
j. Audit/Fraud
k. Contribution
9. Insurance
a. Claims Facility
i. Medical
ii. Exposure
b. Speed
c. Assignability
10. Vote
a. Percentage Necessary
i. Value
ii. Number
b. Filters
i. Medical
ii. Exposure
11. Injunction
a. Permanency
b. Scope
i. Required Relationship
ii. Required Contribution
Any corporate defendant involved in asbestos personal injury litigation
would be able to benefit from this proposed legislation. Current or projected
insolvency would not be necessary in order to trigger the procedures
envisioned in the statute.
In order to enhance the rigor of the negotiation process between a
solvent defendant and asbestos personal injury plaintiffs, all proceedings
would need to be conducted under court supervision. This court could be a
single court of appeals for all such cases, a court of appeals in the
defendant's jurisdiction, or a district court assigned by a court of appeals or
the Judicial Panel for Multi-district Litigation (JPML). The applicable court
would obtain jurisdiction upon notice by the defendant; that jurisdiction
would continue, however, only for a defined period of time and would be
contingent upon certain conditions being met. For instance, there would be
a requirement of good faith negotiation that could be guaranteed by a bond
or other financial commitment.
If the prerequisites were met, the court would issue an injunction staying
all asbestos litigation during the pendency of the negotiations. This stay
could apply either to one defendant or to a larger group of entities, but only
if the same prerequisites were met for each of those additional entities. The
length of the stay could be defined-ninety days or six months, for
example-or could be subject to the discretion of the court, but in no event
should be longer than one year. Furthermore, the opportunity for the
defendant to utilize this procedure would be limited to one occasion.
Upon obtaining jurisdiction, the court would then appoint a committee
of plaintiffs' counsel to negotiate on behalf of the current plaintiffs. This
appointment process would be similar to the methodology used by transferee
judges in multi-district litigations. 0 3  In addition, the committee of
plaintiffs' counsel and any experts they might need would be compensated
from a common benefit fund created by the defendant entities and awarded
by the court.
The court would also appoint a futures representative in a manner
similar to the appointment of a futures representative in bankruptcy cases.'04
There would be a motion by the debtor supported by the plaintiffs'
103. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 20.22 (1995).
104. See II U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(i).
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committee. Agreement of the futures representative would be required in
order for the defendant to achieve the protections afforded by the legislation.
In the event that the defendant has insurance for any portion of its
asbestos personal injury liabilities, the court would also form a committee to
represent those insurers in the negotiations in a manner similar to the manner
in which insurers' interests are represented in all major insurance coverage
litigation. 105
The two most critical aspects of the negotiations among the defendant,
its insurers (if applicable), the current plaintiffs, and the futures
representative would be (1) the amount and form of resources necessary to
fund the trust that would compensate asbestos claimants, and (2) the
approach used to distribute that fund. The court would need to supervise
expeditious discovery designed to obtain adequate information on the
following: (1) the asbestos litigation and settlement history of the corporate
defendant, perhaps on a state-by-state basis; (2) the full financial situation of
the defendant; and (3) the details of any available insurance coverage. In the
event that experts were needed to deal with financial or litigation issues, they
would be hired and paid just as they would be in a multi-district litigation.
Needless to say, the devil is in the details. Because the ultimate
outcome would be negotiated rather than adjudicated, the merits and
demerits of any plan would be subject to bargaining among all the parties.
At the end of the day, the court would need to have a fairness hearing and
make a finding that both the amount and method of funding were adequate
and secure in order for the plan to meet the requirements mandated by the
statute. Rather than an up-front payment in full, the negotiations might lead
to an evergreen trust. Alternatively, contributions to the trust could be in the
form of notes or stock rather than cash. The key factors would be adequacy
and reliability of funding, not form.
Although these negotiations would be difficult, they have been
accomplished in many different contexts and there is little doubt that, in the
appropriate circumstances, they could be successful. This is not to say that
each asbestos defendant would or should avail itself of the provisions of
such an act. Particularly solvent defendants might find the statute
unnecessary, and many plaintiffs would agree that it is unneeded in that
situation. On the other hand, a "free-fall" bankruptcy might be more
appropriate than this proposed act for asbestos defendants who are
financially overburdened.
The statute would also contain preferable tax treatment for certain
aspects of the trust funding. The income from the fund would not be
taxable, and every contribution made by a defendant would be treated as an
ordinary business expense. Despite substantial litigation to require the
federal government to participate financially in any resolution of the
255
105. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 20.22 (1995).
asbestos claims because of its substantial involvement with asbestos,
particularly during World War II, there has been no substantial contribution
by the government. The federal government has agreed, however, to forego
its subrogation rights against asbestos plaintiffs under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act and other federal statutes.
0 6
The applicable court would also need to maintain continuing oversight
to ensure the viability of the fund. In the event of a shortfall, the statute
would provide for a pro-rated reduction in benefits similar to those found in
trust funds created under current bankruptcy proceedings. The fund would
never be reconstituted because any reopening of the proceedings would
defeat the purposes of providing financial certainty to participating
defendants. This finality would also provide an incentive to the court to
make its findings with substantial certainty.
Part of the judicial supervision would be an annual audit of the fund.
The precise management of the fund, however, could be left to the
negotiation process because its governance would need to follow the precise
nature of the currency or currencies. For instance, the administrative
requirements for an evergreen trust would be quite different than for a trust
funded with stock. In all cases, there would need to be administration with
at least the same level of responsibility as an administrator of an employee
benefit plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.1 7
The treatment of the trust distribution plan (TDP) would be quite
complex. The following discussion raises most of the difficult issues in a
TDP, but it is debatable how many of these issues should be addressed in the
legislation and how many should be left to the negotiation process. For
example, most parties would favor the inclusion of the requirement of at
least a rough equivalency between current and future claimants in the TDP,
but it may not be necessary to have a precise definition of "equivalency."
Similarly, most parties would favor an alternative dispute resolution
mechanism, but it would probably not need to be prescribed in any detail.
Certain other potential provisions in the statute would be more controversial.
Examples include a provision imposing a "collar" on malignancy and non-
malignancy payments and a provision setting the precise nature or
composition of a trust advisory committee made up of plaintiffs' counsel or
insurance carriers.
The statute would probably mirror § 524(g) in mandating that present
and future claims be valued and paid in substantially the same manner.'0 8
Liquidation values would probably be based on a grid with faster and lower
payments for those who present less extensive evidence of physical harm
and exposure. There would be, however, precisely defined minimum
medical and exposure criteria required for any payment. For the more
seriously injured and exposed, there would be higher payments and more
individualized review. The threshold levels, grid amounts, ratios, and
106. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2000).
107. See29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
108. See II U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(v).
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flexibility in payment ranges would probably be left to the negotiations. It
would be possible, however, to establish certain statutory requirements. For
example, the statute might mandate that malignancies be paid before non-
malignancies or that medical monitoring be available for everyone exposed,
or perhaps that anyone suffering a more severe harm at a later date could
return to receive a second payment.
The TDP would be managed by an administrator and would be subject
to a variety of safeguards including internal fraud protection, financial and
medical audits, and annual oversight by the court. The defendant, plaintiffs'
committee, futures representative, and insurers, if applicable, would have at
least minimal access to the administrator's records in order to maintain their
confidence in the implementation of the TDP.
Under the proposed statute, payment to a claimant would be treated as a
settlement for purposes of calculating contribution and taxes. Any claimants
dissatisfied with their offers from the fund could avail themselves of ADR,
including arbitration. The statute would provide that, if a case was not
resolved, the claimant could access the tort system. The statute would
preclude the claimant from receiving punitive damages and would require a
payment schedule that would render the compensation of the opt out plaintiff
comparable to that of participants in the fund.
The insurance aspects of the proposed statute would probably be among
the most controversial and contentious provisions. The intent is to have an
even playing field, but the implementation of this intent would be
challenging, if not impossible. Most insurers have written their insurance
policies based upon assumptions about the tort system. If claims are subject
to less rigorous filters or are processed more quickly under the statute than in
normal litigation, there could be dire repercussions for the capitalization of
the entire insurance industry. Resolving the total potential liability of an
insured at the time the statute applies, and then utilizing a claims resolution
facility rather than a court to process claims creates a major disadvantage for
insurers. An insured that files for bankruptcy, for example, can argue that
the entire amount of the insurance coverage is due and payable on the
effective date of a plan of reorganization. In addition, as indicated above,
the insured has additional bargaining leverage because it can offer the
insurer a § 524(g) release if the insurance disputes are resolved prior to the
effective date. 109
How, then, can there be sensible treatment of insurers? First, the criteria
that determine the amount of payments to claimants and the application of
those criteria would probably need to be comparable to the existing tort
system of litigation and settlement. The TDP cannot constitute precedent
regarding the validity of claims, but there would need to be some security
for any future insurance funding. Second, the velocity of payments would
109. See II U.S.C. § 524(g).
not be accelerated by virtue of the statutory settlement. The court should
attempt to determine, based on history and experience, what the "normal"
velocity of the case would be without the statutory acceleration. Third, the
insurance carriers would not use the typical litigation delays involved in
insurance coverage cases to calculate the timing of their contractual
obligations. Fourth, any legal decisions regarding insurance contracts or
agreements could be made by a judge not overseeing the negotiations. On
balance, the goal is to minimize any deviation from the normal payment of
insurance proceeds. The court could not approve the protections afforded by
the statute in a way that would disadvantage either the insured or the insurer
in the total amount to be paid, its availability, or the velocity of the payment.
Each situation would be different and a statue cannot define with
specificity what the guidelines would require in any given setting. Thus, the
court would need to have wide discretion to decide whether the proposed
settlement between the defendant and tort claimants adversely impacts the
insurance status quo. This decision by the court would need to be made
within the statutory time frame allowed for the completion of a settlement.
Thus, the insurers would have a seat at the table to increase their bargaining
power in the negotiations, but would not have the ability to veto a settlement
unless the court ruled that the proposed settlement undercut their contractual
rights.
Another of the more problematic sections of the proposed statute relates
to voting procedures; both the quantum and the qualifications present
difficulties. Under § 524(g), at least seventy-five percent of all the asbestos
claimants must vote in favor of the plan of reorganization." 0 Under
traditional bankruptcy standards, there must be a positive vote of at least
fifty percent in number and two-thirds in value of the members of a class of
claimants."' Neither one of these models is completely satisfactory because
each is based upon the assumptions that there is a financially bankrupt
debtor and that it is appropriate to give superior bargaining power to
creditors. In the § 524(g) without bankruptcy scenario, that assumption is
incorrect. The corporate defendant is solvent and has a desire to liquidate
and pay its asbestos liabilities in full.
The normal bankruptcy approach to the qualifications for voting is to
give each entity and each dollar a vote." 2 As a practical matter, each
asbestos personal injury claimant is given one vote, and each claim is valued
at $1, in accordance with the relative disease payment outlines in the TDP.
The assumption behind these decisions is that the process of evaluating each
personal injury claim to establish its validity and its value would simply take
too long and be too expensive to accomplish prior to a vote. In a normal
bankruptcy, the total value of all asbestos personal injury claims is estimated
first; the time for liquidating claims comes after the effective date and is
110. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(iv)(bb).
111. IIU.S.C.§1126(c)(2000).
112. See id.
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accomplished by a claims resolution facility in accordance with the plan of
reorganization.
Both the quantum and qualification issues would need to be resolved in
the statute. Leaving these issues to the court would not provide the level of
predictability necessary to negotiate under the act; these issues are simply
too critical to be left open. One way to promote the negotiation process
would be to establish strong filters for the voting process by creating an
administrative process that could establish a threshold for the right to vote;
this threshold would be similar to the threshold which must be met to receive
payment under some of the asbestos bankruptcy trusts. For example, a
medical report, based upon a medical examination, and an affidavit or other
proof of exposure could be required in order for a claimant to vote.
Alternatively, the Manville Trust criteria or other established medical and
exposure criteria could be applied as a prerequisite to the right to vote." 13
Another alternative would be to eliminate the need for a vote altogether
by expanding the court's role to include authority over the issues that might
have been resolved by negotiation. If a court were to find that current and
future plaintiffs will be paid equivalently and in full, then the court could
order all asbestos plaintiffs to participate in the statutorily designed
compensation system. 114
Finally, the form and scope of an injunction or other relief terminating
the defendant's asbestos personal injury liability must be provided by the
statute. The statute would need to define what entities could be covered by
the permanent injunction and their required levels of contribution. Parent
companies, financial entities, insurers, and others similarly situated could be
covered by the injunction, but their participation would be based upon
contributions similar to those required under § 524(g). 1 5 The court would
provide the form of the injunction and the parties would negotiate the
entities to be covered, subject to the court's approval.
In order for Congress to pass this type of statute, there would probably
need to be at least passive agreement among labor unions, the plaintiffs'
asbestos bar, affected corporations, and insurance carriers that such a statute
would be favorable. It is likely that claimants would find this statute
attractive. Defendant corporations would agree only if they felt that there
was a sufficiently even playing field upon which they could negotiate with
the plaintiffs' bar. Their focus would be on the number and the quality of
those plaintiffs eligible to vote and the total financial contribution required
by the TDP. Defendants would compare that amount with their anticipated
costs under the existing litigation system and choose the lowest cost
113. See In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 878 F. Supp. 473, 581-601 (1995).
114. See The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2003: Hearings before the United
States Senate, 108th Cong. (2003).
115. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g).
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alternative. Insurers would focus not only on the amount of money required
by the plan, but also on the velocity of the payments. The simple fact that
under the statute there might be more settlements earlier by more defendants
than anticipated would probably lead them to find the current litigation
system preferable to the statute. Therefore, for the proposed statute to
succeed, the key parties will need to compromise on all these issues.
IV. CONCLUSION
Over sixty companies have filed for bankruptcy because of asbestos
litigation. The average length of time that these companies have stayed in
bankruptcy has been over four years. There have also been over five
prepackaged asbestos bankruptcies. These corporations' length of time in
bankruptcy has been less than a year. The total value of the resulting trusts
from these bankruptcies is over $10 billion. The amount currently in
controversy is over $20 billion. There has to be a better way to deal with a
national tragedy.
Legislators, judges, and lawyers have concluded that the only
appropriate end game for asbestos litigation must be provided by legislation.
The existing legal mechanisms are simply inadequate. The task is to find a
legislative proposal that can achieve the political support necessary for
passage by Congress.
One of the potential solutions is to allow companies to achieve a final
resolution of the asbestos claims filed against them by entering into a court-
sanctioned negotiation with all the relevant stakeholders. Marketplace
bargaining against the backdrop of litigation can provide a more level
playing field and achieve socially acceptable finality to these potential
liabilities. The concept is to give claimants the same relief that is obtainable
in bankruptcy under § 524(g) and use the same protections provided by
bankruptcy proceedings, but eliminate the necessity of putting entire
enterprises into bankruptcy. The § 524(g) without bankruptcy proposal is a
legitimate contender for congressional approval and has the potential to
create a statutory end game for asbestos litigation.
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